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About this product
- Author(s)Geir B. Asheim
- PublisherSpringer-Verlag New York Inc.
- Date of Publication15/12/2011
- Series TitleTheory and Decision Library C
- Series Part/Volume Number37
- Place of PublicationNew York, NY
- Country of PublicationUnited States
- ImprintSpringer-Verlag New York Inc.
- Content Noteblack & white illustrations
- Weight355 g
- Width156 mm
- Height234 mm
- Spine12 mm
- Format DetailsTrade paperback (US)
- Edition Statement2006
- Table Of ContentsDedication v List of Figures xi List of Tables xiii Preface xv 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Conditions for Nash equilibrium 1.2 Modeling backward and forward induction 1.3 Integrating decision theory and game theory 2. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES 2.1 Six examples 2.2 Overview over concepts 3. DECISION-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK 3.1 Motivation 3.2 Axioms 3.3 Representation results 4. BELIEF OPERATORS 4.1 From preferences to accessibility relations 4.2 Defining and characterizing belief operators 4.3 Properties of belief operators 4.4 Relation to other non-monotonic operators 5. BASIC CHARACTERIZATIONS 5.1 Epistemic modeling of strategic games 5.2 Consistency of preferences 5.3 Admissible consistency of preferences 6. RELAXING COMPLETENESS 6.1 Epistemic modeling of strategic games (cont.) 6.2 Consistency of preferences (cont.) 6.3 Admissible consistency of preferences (cont.) 7. BACKWARD INDUCTION 7.1 Epistemic modeling of extensive games 7.2 Initial belief of opponent rationality 7.3 Belief in each subgame of opponent rationality 7.4 Discussion 8. SEQUENTIALITY 8.1 Epistemic modeling of extensive games (cont.) 8.2 Sequential consistency 8.3 Weak sequential consistency 8.4 Relation to backward induction 9. QUASI-PERFECTNESS 9.1 Quasi-perfect consistency 9.2 Relating rationalizability concepts 10. PROPERNESS 10.1 An illustration 10.2 Proper consistency 10.3 Relating rationalizability concepts (cont.) 10.4 Induction in a betting game 11. CAPTURING FORWARD INDUCTION THROUGH FULL PERMISSIBILITY 11.1 Illustrating the key features 11.2 IECFA and fully permissible sets 11.3 Full admissible consistency 11.4 Investigating examples 11.5 Related literature 12. APPLYING FULL PERMISSIBILITYTO EXTENSIVE GAMES 12.1 Motivation 12.2 Justifying extensive form application 12.3 Backward induction 12.4 Forward induction 12.5 Concluding remarks Appendices A. Proofs of results in Chapter 4 B. Proofs of results in Chapters 8-10 C. Proofs of results in Chapter 11 References Index
- Author BiographyGeir B. Asheim is Professor of Economics at the University of Oslo, Norway. In additional to investigating epistemic conditions for gametheoretic solution concepts, he is doing research on questions relating to intergenerational justice.
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