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About this product
Product Identifiers
PublisherMIT Press
ISBN-100262524406
ISBN-139780262524407
eBay Product ID (ePID)44180931
Product Key Features
Book TitleLogic of Political Survival
Number of Pages550 Pages
LanguageEnglish
Publication Year2005
TopicPublic Policy / General, History & Theory, Economics / General, Presidents & Heads of State
IllustratorYes
GenrePolitical Science, Biography & Autobiography, Business & Economics
AuthorBruce Bueno De Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson
FormatTrade Paperback
Dimensions
Item Height1 in
Item Weight31.1 Oz
Item Length9 in
Item Width7 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceTrade
Reviews"In recent years, the boundaries between international relations and comparative politics have become ever more porous. This book represents the first full-scale integration of the two fields, adding dramatically to both. Political scientists will be confronting its theory and evidence for years to come." -Barry Weingast, Ward C. Krebs Family Professor of Political Science, Stanford University
TitleLeadingThe
Dewey Edition21
Grade FromCollege Graduate Student
Dewey Decimal320/.01/1
SynopsisAn ambitious theoretical and empirical study of the effect of political institutions on leadership survival, the character of public policy, and economic development., The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not. The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.