Product Information
Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? This book argues that they are useful for deterrence but not for offensive purposes.Product Identifiers
PublisherCambridge University Press
ISBN-10110710694x
ISBN-139781107106949
eBay Product ID (ePID)18038778911
Product Key Features
Number of Pages343 Pages
LanguageEnglish
Publication Year2017
SubjectMilitary / Nuclear Warfare, Environmental, International Relations / General
TypeTextbook
AuthorMatthew Fuhrmann, Todd S. Sechser
Subject AreaLaw, History, Political Science
FormatHardcover
Dimensions
Item Height0.9 in
Item Weight20.8 Oz
Item Length9.3 in
Item Width6.3 in
Additional Product Features
Dewey Edition23
ReviewsAdvance praise: 'This fascinating book is, I believe intentionally, more provocative than merely persuasive, more skeptical than most among us are. It looks at the history of international negotiation, both explicit and by maneuver, in the presence of nuclear weapons and concludes that disparities in nuclear armaments - including zero on one side - make much less difference than they are given credit for. If the argument doesn't persuade you, the forty case studies of nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining (eleven involving the United States) will make you think it over.' Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences
Target AudienceScholarly & Professional
IllustratedYes
Dewey Decimal355.825119
Lc Classification NumberU264
Table of ContentPart I. The Logic of Nuclear Skepticism: 1. Nuclear blackmail in international politics; 2. Nuclear coercion and nuclear skepticism; Part II. Trends: 3. Standoffs: nuclear weapons in crisis bargaining; 4. Stalemates: territorial disputes and nuclear politics; Part III. Cases: 5. Brinkmanship busts: when nuclear coercion fails; 6. Think again: reassessing nuclear victories; Part IV. Conclusions: 7. Nuclear coercion in myth and reality.