Intended AudienceCollege Audience
Reviews"Air Power and the Evacuation of Dunkirk is a well balanced account of the air operations conducted by the RAF and the Luftwaffe and the effectiveness of both forces in their efforts to influence the evacuation of British and French forces at Dunkirk. It is a most welcome addition to the literature of the Second World War and air power studies generally-one that will be consulted for years to come because it challenges and revises many of the myths surrounding the Dunkirk evacuation. This alone makes it required reading for anyone interested in its subject." -- Michigan War Studies Review "This seminal study shows the extent of Raffal's impressive research prowess. It most certainly cements his position as an air power historian." -- The Journal of the RAF Historical Society "Harry Raffal's Air Power and the Evacuation of Dunkirk is a welcome addition to the overlooked role of the Royal Air Force over Dunkirk during the grim withdrawal of British troops from France in the Summer of 1940. This captivating and meticulously researched book is a first-rate contribution to the literature on the RAF." -- Alex M Spencer, Ph.D., Curator National Air and Space Museum, Washington, DC, USA "Through extensive research, Dr Raffal brings a wholly fresh perspective onto the seemingly well-known subject of the air battle over Dunkirk in 1940. This excellent book is highly original, very well organized, lucidly written, and underpinned by an impressive knowledge of the relevant archives." -- Dr David Omissi, Author of Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939, UK, "Air Power and the Evacuation of Dunkirk is a well balanced account of the air operations conducted by the RAF and the Luftwaffe and the effectiveness of both forces in their efforts to influence the evacuation of British and French forces at Dunkirk. It is a most welcome addition to the literature of the Second World War and air power studies generally-one that will be consulted for years to come because it challenges and revises many of the myths surrounding the Dunkirk evacuation. This alone makes it required reading for anyone interested in its subject." -- Michigan War Studies Review "Dr. Raffal's detailed examination of the role of air power in the evacuation of British and French forces from Dunkirk in May-June 1940 is an excellent case study in the application and effectiveness of air power ... Highly recommended." -- Air & Space Power Journal "This seminal study shows the extent of Raffal's impressive research prowess. It most certainly cements his position as an air power historian." -- The Journal of the RAF Historical Society "Harry Raffal's Air Power and the Evacuation of Dunkirk is a welcome addition to the overlooked role of the Royal Air Force over Dunkirk during the grim withdrawal of British troops from France in the Summer of 1940. This captivating and meticulously researched book is a first-rate contribution to the literature on the RAF." -- Alex M Spencer, Ph.D., Curator National Air and Space Museum, Washington, DC, USA "Through extensive research, Dr Raffal brings a wholly fresh perspective onto the seemingly well-known subject of the air battle over Dunkirk in 1940. This excellent book is highly original, very well organized, lucidly written, and underpinned by an impressive knowledge of the relevant archives." -- Dr David Omissi, Author of Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939, UK, "Harry Raffal's Air Power and the Evacuation of Dunkirk is a welcome addition to the overlooked role of the Royal Air Force over Dunkirk during the grim withdrawal of British troops from France in the Summer of 1940. This captivating and meticulously researched book is a first-rate contribution to the literature on the RAF." -- Alex M Spencer, Ph.D., Curator National Air and Space Museum, Washington, DC, USA "Through extensive research, Dr Raffal brings a wholly fresh perspective onto the seemingly well-known subject of the air battle over Dunkirk in 1940. This excellent book is highly original, very well organized, lucidly written, and underpinned by an impressive knowledge of the relevant archives." -- Dr David Omissi, Author of Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919-1939, UK "This seminal study shows the extent of Raffal's impressive research prowess. It most certainly cements his position as an air power historian." -- The Journal of the RAF Historical Society
Dewey Decimal940.5421428
Table Of ContentAcknowledgements Table of Contents List of Figures and Tables Abbreviations Introduction Chapter 1 : The Two Forces Chapter 2 : The Luftwaffe's Attacks On Dynamo, 29 May and 1 June. Chapter 3 : German Artillery Fire and the Suspension of Daylight Evacuations. 105 Chapter 4 : The Luftwaffe's Attacks on Dunkirk Before 29 May Chapter 5 : The Luftwaffe's Attacks on Dunkirk on 30-31 May Chapter 6 : Results, Limitations and Potential Of Luftwaffe Night Attacks and Mine Operations Chapter 7 : RAF and Luftwaffe Fighter Operations During Dynamo Chapter 8 : The Operations of Coastal Command and the Fleet Air Arm Chapter 9 : The Operations of Bomber Command Conclusion Appendices Appendix I: Map of The Routes to Dunkirk and the Beaches Appendix II: List of Ships Mentioned Appendix III: Glossary Bibliography Index
SynopsisThe evacuation of Dunkirk has been immortalised in books, prints and films, narrated as a story of an outnumbered, inexperienced RAF defeating the battle-hardened Luftwaffe and protecting the evacuation. This book revives the historiography by analysing the air operations during the evacuation. Raffal draws from German and English sources, many for the first time in the context of Operation DYNAMO, to argue that both sides suffered a defeat over Dunkirk. . This work examines the resources and tactics of both sides during DYNAMO and challenges the traditional view that the Luftwaffe held the advantage. The success that the Luftwaffe achieved during DYNAMO, including halting daylight evacuations on 1 June, is evaluated and the supporting role of RAF Bomber and Coastal Command is explored in detail for the first time. Concluding that the RAF was not responsible for the Luftwaffe's failure to prevent the evacuation, Raffal demonstrates that the reasons lay elsewhere.
LC Classification NumberD756.5.D8.R34 2023