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About this product
Product Identifiers
PublisherCambridge University Press
ISBN-101107106672
ISBN-139781107106673
eBay Product ID (ePID)219132309
Product Key Features
Number of Pages276 Pages
LanguageEnglish
Publication NamePrice of a Vote in the Middle East : Ethnicity and Clientelism
Publication Year2016
SubjectEthnic Studies / General, Political Process / General, Political Process / Campaigns & Elections, World / General, World / Middle Eastern
TypeTextbook
Subject AreaPolitical Science, Social Science
AuthorDaniel Corstange
SeriesCambridge Studies in Comparative Politics Ser.
FormatHardcover
Dimensions
Item Height0.7 in
Item Weight21.2 Oz
Item Length9 in
Item Width6 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional
LCCN2015-040725
TitleLeadingThe
Dewey Edition23
IllustratedYes
Dewey Decimal324.956
Table Of Content1. Introduction; 2. Ethnic constituencies; 3. Communal politics in Lebanon; 4. Communal politics in Yemen; 5. Contemporary clientelism; 6. Captive audiences and public services; 7. Intermingled vote markets; 8. Perverse competition; 9. Conclusion.
SynopsisClientelism and ethnic favoritism appear to go hand in hand in many diverse societies in the developing world. However, while some ethnic communities receive generous material rewards for their political support, others receive very modest payoffs. In this study the author examines this key, and often overlooked, component of clientelism., Clientelism and ethnic favoritism appear to go hand in hand in many diverse societies in the developing world. However, while some ethnic communities receive generous material rewards for their political support, others receive very modest payoffs. The Price of a Vote in the Middle East examines this key - and often overlooked - component of clientelism. The author draws on elite interviews and original survey data collected during his years of field research in Lebanon and Yemen; two Arab countries in which political constituencies follow sectarian, regional, and tribal divisions. He demonstrates that voters in internally-competitive communal groups receive more, and better, payoffs for their political support than voters trapped in uncompetitive groups dominated by a single, hegemonic leader. Ultimately, politicians provide services when compelled by competitive pressures to do so, whereas leaders sheltered from competition can, and do, take their supporters for granted.