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Military History and Policy Ser.: Command and Control in Military Crisis : Devious Decisions by Harald Hoiback (2003, Hardcover)

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About this product

Product Identifiers

PublisherRoutledge

ISBN-100714654906

ISBN-139780714654904

eBay Product ID (ePID)2369929

Product Key Features

Number of Pages146 Pages

LanguageEnglish

Publication NameCommand and Control in Military Crisis : Devious Decisions

Publication Year2003

SubjectMilitary Science, Military / General, Military / World War I, Security (National & International), Military

TypeTextbook

Subject AreaPolitical Science, Technology & Engineering, Biography & Autobiography, History

AuthorHarald Hoiback

SeriesMilitary History and Policy Ser.

FormatHardcover

Dimensions

Item Height0.7 in

Item Weight13.6 Oz

Item Length9.4 in

Item Width6.4 in

Additional Product Features

Intended AudienceCollege Audience

LCCN2003-043887

Dewey Edition21

Series Volume NumberVol. 12

IllustratedYes

Dewey Decimal355.3/3041

SynopsisHarald Hoiback's study focuses upon two events - the 1918 Allied meeting at Doullens when the Allies ceded control to an officer, and the Norwegian decision in 1940 to leave control in the hands of a colonel which led to the Nazi invasion., Breaking with the tradition that literature about the direction and coordination of military forces should only deal with technology and procedures, this work also takes into account the underlying domestic conditions of a conflict, including cultural, personal and political relations. The book focuses on two instances, where fundamental assumptions were at loggerheads and provides a theoretical "nuts and bolts" approach introduced within the opening chapters. Firstly, the book investigates the effect of the several armies present "in the field" without any central authority during March 1918. It explores how this expensive luxury, as the Germans threatened to destroy the allied forces, caused internal British disagreements over strategy which weakened the British Expeditionary Force. The second case analyses how Norway tumbled into war in 1940. The Norwegian government had a tacit, incoherent and ill-coordinated plan for how they should once again keep Norway out of war. As a consequence, the de facto decision to resist German aggression was in fact taken by a rather insignificant colonel. This case demonstrates how the underlying conditions of command and control and not the actual directives from the government were the historical focus which determined Norway's destiny., This study focuses upon two events - the 1918 Allied meeting at Doullens when the Allies ceded control to an officer, and the Norwegian decision in 1940 to leave control in the hands of a colonel which led to the Nazi invasion.

LC Classification NumberUB210