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About this product
Product Identifiers
PublisherCambridge University Press
ISBN-100521313813
ISBN-139780521313810
eBay Product ID (ePID)865638
Product Key Features
Number of Pages296 Pages
LanguageEnglish
Publication NameEconomics of Imperfect Information
Publication Year1989
SubjectOperations Research, Economics / Microeconomics, Library & Information Science / General
TypeTextbook
Subject AreaLanguage Arts & Disciplines, Business & Economics
AuthorLouis Phlips
FormatTrade Paperback
Dimensions
Item Height0.6 in
Item Weight15.5 Oz
Item Length9 in
Item Width6 in
Additional Product Features
Intended AudienceScholarly & Professional
LCCN88-015096
TitleLeadingThe
Dewey Edition19
IllustratedYes
Dewey Decimal330.1
Table Of ContentList of figures and tables; Preface; Acknowledgments; 1. Preliminaries; Part I. Statics: 2. Asymmetric price information; 3. Asymmetric quality information; 4. Auctions; 5. Signaling equilibria; Part II. Dynamics: 6. Oligopoly and collusion; 7. Predatory pricing; 8. Efficient double auctions; References; Index.
SynopsisThis book provides a systematic presentation of new microeconomic theories of imperfect information. Each chapter explores a particular type of informational asymmetry and reviews major papers. Wherever possible the theories are compared with experimental evidence. An extensive bibliography is included., This book provides a systematic presentation of new microeconomic theories of imperfect information. Each chapter explores a particular type of informational asymmetry and reviews major papers. Wherever possible the theories are compared with experimental evidence. An extensive bibliography is included. Part I, statics, begins with an examination of how imperfect price or quantity information on the buyer's side provides new explanations of phenomena such as price dispersion and sales or resale price maintenance. A thorough discussion of private value auctions and common value auctions follows. Subsequent chapters investigate the links between uncertainty about personal characteristics and job signaling, incomplete insurance coverage, and credit rationing by banks. Part II, dynamics, relates the dynamics of collusion, predation, and market efficiency to the transmission, pooling, and aggregation of private information. Game theoretic findings and their implications for antitrust policy are included., This is the first systematic textbook presentation of the new microeconomic theories based on imperfect information. Each chapter explores a particular type of informational asymmetry and reviews the main contributions, from the seminal papers of the late 1960s through the most recent developments. Wherever possible the theories covered are confronted with the available experimental evidence.