Product Information
Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others?internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication?usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the autonomy of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.Product Identifiers
PublisherT.H.E. University of Chicago Press
ISBN-139780226435312
eBay Product ID (ePID)91856899
Product Key Features
Number of Pages299 Pages
Publication NameThe Logic of Delegation
LanguageEnglish
SubjectGovernment, Politics
Publication Year1991
TypeTextbook
Subject AreaPolitical Science
AuthorD. Roderick Kiewiet, Mathew D. Mccubbins
SeriesAmerican Politics and Political Economy Series
FormatPaperback
Dimensions
Item Height228 mm
Item Weight428 g
Additional Product Features
Country/Region of ManufactureUnited States
Title_AuthorMathew D. Mccubbins, D. Roderick Kiewiet